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IN THE UTAH COURT OF APPEALS

STATE OF UTAH,
Plaintiff/Appellee,

:
:

vs.

Case No. 20060309-CA
THOMAS CLARK HILL,
Defendant/Appellant.

:
:

BRIEF OF APPELLANT

JURISDICTION AND NATURE OF PROCEEDINGS
This appeal is from a plea and subsequent sentencing to Aggravated
Assault, a third degree felony in violation of UCA§76-5-103, and Violation of
a Protective Order, a third degree felony in violation of UCA§76-5-108. On
March 13, 2006, the Honorable Roger S. Dutson signed an entry of judgment,
sentence and commitment sentencing the Defendant to serve two consecutive
terms of zero to five years at the Utah State Prison. On April 12, 2006, the
Defendant filed an amended notice of appeal. This Court has jurisdiction over
this appeal pursuant to Utah Code Ann. §78-2a-3(2)(e)(2003).

ISSUE ON APPEAL AND STANDARD OF REVIEW
DID THE TRIAL COURT ABUSE ITS DISCRETION WHEN
IT SENTENCED THE DEFENDANT TO PRISON?
Standard of Review: The Court must determine whether the trial court abused
its discretion when it sentenced the Defendant to consecutive prison sentences
prison even though the advances were accomplished in the same criminal
episode. "A sentence will not be overturned on appeal unless the trial court has
abused its discretion, failed to consider all legally relevant factors, or imposed
a sentence that exceeds legally prescribed limits.55 State v. Nuttall, 861 P.2d
454,456 (Utah Ct. App. 1993).

CONSTITUTIONAL PROVISIONS, STATUTES, AND RULES

§ 76-1-402. Separate offenses arising out of single criminal episodeIncluded offenses
(1) A defendant may be prosecuted in a single criminal action for all separate
offenses arising out of a single criminal episode; however, when the same act
of a defendant under a single criminal episode shall establish offenses which
may be punished in different ways under different provisions of this code, the
act shall be punishable under only one such provision; an acquittal or
conviction and sentence under any such provision bars a prosecution under any
other such provision.
(2) Whenever conduct may establish separate offenses under a single criminal
episode, unless the court otherwise orders to promote justice, a defendant shall
not be subject to separate trials for multiple offenses when:
7

(a) The offenses are within the jurisdiction of a single court; and
(b) The offenses are known to the prosecuting attorney at the time the
defendant is arraigned on the first information or indictment.
(3) A defendant may be convicted of an offense included in the offense
charged but may not be convicted of both the offense charged and the included
offense. An offense is so included when:
(a) It is established by proof of the same or less than all the facts
required to establish the commission of the offense charged; or
(b) It constitutes an attempt, solicitation, conspiracy, or form of
preparation to commit the offense charged or an offense otherwise
included therein; or
(c) It is specifically designated by a statute as a lesser included offense.
(4) The court shall not be obligated to charge the jury with respect to an
included offense unless there is a rational basis for a verdict acquitting the
defendant of the offense charged and convicting him of the included offense.
(5) If the district court on motion after verdict or judgment, or an appellate
court on appeal or certiorari, shall determine that there is insufficient evidence
to support a conviction for the offense charged but that there is sufficient
evidence to support a conviction for an included offense and the trier of fact
necessarily found every fact required for conviction of that included offense,
the verdict or judgment of conviction may be set aside or reversed and a
judgment of conviction entered for the included offense, without necessity of a
new trial, if such relief is sought by the defendant.

§ 76-3-401. Concurrent or consecutive sentences-Limitations—Definition
(1) A court shall determine, if a defendant has been adjudged guilty of more
than one felony offense, whether to impose concurrent or consecutive
sentences for the offenses. The court shall state on the record and shall indicate
in the order of judgment and commitment:

^

(a)
if the sentences imposed are to run concurrently or consecutively
to each other; and
(b) if the sentences before the court are to run concurrently or
consecutively with any other sentences the defendant is already serving.
(2) In determining whether state offenses are to run concurrently or
consecutively, the court shall consider the gravity and circumstances of the
offenses, the number of victims, and the history, character, and rehabilitative
needs of the defendant.
(3) The court shall order that sentences for state offenses run consecutively if
the later offense is committed while the defendant is imprisoned or on parole,
unless the court finds and states on the record that consecutive sentencing
would be inappropriate.
(4) If a written order of commitment does not clearly state whether the
sentences are to run consecutively or concurrently, the Board of Pardons and
Parole shall request clarification from the court. Upon receipt of the request,
the court shall enter a clarified order of commitment stating whether the
sentences are to run consecutively or concurrently.
(5) A court may impose consecutive sentence for offenses arising out of a
single criminal episode as defined in section 76-1-401.
(6)

(a) If a court imposes consecutive sentences, the aggregate maximum of
all sentences imposed may not exceed 30 years imprisonment,
except as provided under Subsection (6)(b).
(b) The limitation under Subsection (6)(a) does not apply if:
(i) an offense for which the defendant is sentenced authorizes the
death penalty or a maximum sentence of life imprisonment; or
(ii) the defendant is convicted of an additional offense based on
conduct which occurs after his initial sentence or sentences are
imposed.

4

(7) The limitation in Subsection (6)(a) applies if a defendant:
(a) is sentenced at the same time for more than one offense;
(b) is sentenced at different times for one or more offenses, all of which
were committed prior to imposition of the defendant's initial sentence;
or
(c) has already been sentenced by a court of this state other than the
present sentencing court or by a court of another state or federal
jurisdiction, and the conduct giving rise to the present offense did not
occur after his initial sentencing by any other court.
(8) When the limitation of Subsection (6)(a) applies, determining the effect of
consecutive sentences and the manner in which they shall be served, the Board
of Pardons and Parole shall treat the defendant as though he has been
committed for a single term that consists of the aggregate of the validly
imposed prison terms as follows:
(a) if the aggregate maximum term exceeds the 30-year limitation, the
maximum sentence is considered to be 30 years; and
(b) when indeterminate sentences run consecutively, the minimum term,
if any, constitutes the aggregate of the validly imposed minimum terms.
(9) When a sentence is imposed or sentences are imposed to run concurrently
with the other or with a sentence presently being served, the term that provides
the longer remaining imprisonment constitutes the time to be served.
(10) This section may not be construed to restrict the number or length of
individual consecutive sentences that may be imposed or to affect the validity
of any sentence so imposed, but only to limit the length of sentences actually
served under the commitments.
(11) This section may not be construed to limit the authority of a court to
impose consecutive sentences in misdemeanor cases.
(12) As used in this section, "imprisoned" means sentenced and committed to a
secure correctional facility as defined in Section 64-13-1, the sentence has not

5

been terminated or voided, and the person is not on parole, regardless of where
the person is located.
§76-5-103. Aggravated assault
(1) A person commits aggravated assault if he commits assault as defined in
Section 76-5-102 and he:
(a) intentionally causes serious bodily injury to another; or
(b) under circumstances not amounting to a violation of Subsection (l)(a),
uses a dangerous weapon as defined in Section 76-1-601 or other means or
force likely to produce death or serious bodily injury.
(2) A violation of Subsection (l)(a) is a second degree felony.
(3) A violation of Subsection (l)(b) is a third degree felony.

§76-5-108. Protective orders restraining abuse of another — Violation.
(1) Any person who is the respondent or defendant subject to a protective
order, child protective order, ex parte protective order, or ex parte child
protective order issued under Title 30, Chapter 6, Cohabitant Abuse Act, or
Title 78, Chapter 3a, Juvenile Court Act of 1996, Title 77, Chapter 36,
Cohabitant Abuse Procedures Act, or a foreign protection order enforceable
under Title 30, Chapter 6a, Uniform Interstate Enforcement of Domestic
Violence Protection Orders Act, who intentionally or knowingly violates that
order after having been properly served, is guilty of a class A misdemeanor,
except as a greater penalty may be provided in Title 77, Chapter 36, Cohabitant
Abuse Procedures Act.
(2) Violation of an order as described in Subsection (1) is a domestic
violence offense under Section 77-36-1 and subject to increased penalties in
accordance with Section 77-36-1.1.
§78-2a-3(2)(e)(2003). Court of Appeals jurisdiction.
(2) The Court of Appeals has appellate jurisdiction, including jurisdiction of
interlocutory appeals, over:
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(e) appeals from a court of record in criminal cases, except those
involving a conviction or charge of a first degree felony or capital felony;

STATEMENT OF THE CASE
The Defendant was originally charged by information with aggravated
burglary, a first degree felony; aggravated kidnapping a first degree felony;
aggravated assault, a third degree felony; violation of protective order, a third
degree felony; possession of a dangerous weapon by a restricted person, a third
degree felony; and attempted murder a second-degree felony. (R. 001). On
October 21, 2005, the Defendant appeared in court and conditionally waived
his preliminary hearing. On January 13, 2006, the Defendant pled guilty to the
charges Aggravated Assault, a third degree felony in violation of UCA§76-5103, and Violation of a Protective Order, a third degree felony in violation of
UCA§76-5-108. The State dismissed the remaining charges pursuant to the
plea negotiation. The Defendant was sentenced on March 13, 2006, to two
consecutive terms of zero to five years at the Utah State Prison. (R. 061). The
Sentence, Judgment and Commitment was signed on March 13, 2006. A
notice of appeal was filed on April 12,006.
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STATEMENT OF THE FACTS
The Defendant was originally charged by information with aggravated
burglary, a first degree felony, aggravated kidnapping a first degree felony,
aggravated assault a third degree felony, violation of protective order a third
degree felony, possession of a dangerous weapon by a restricted person a third
degree felony, and attempted murder a second-degree felony.(R. 001).
According to the facts set forth by the prosecution at the time of the entry of
the plea, the Defendant was served with a protective order on May 18, 2005.
The protective order prohibited the Defendant from having any direct or
indirect contact, committing any acts of violence, or being at the victim's
residence. The Defendant had previously been convicted of domestic violence
on June 4, 2003. On or about August 9, 2005, the Defendant was staying at the
victim's residence, and he and the victim got into an argument. During the
argument the Defendant used an "army style butter knife" against the victim
and stabbed her in the back of the neck causing a small puncture wound and
also stabbed her in the arm, again causing a small puncture wound. (R. 073 / 4)

SUMMARY OF ARGUMENTS
The trial court abused its discretion when it sentenced the Defendant to
consecutive terms at the Utah State Prison. The Court should have considered
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the four mitigating factors outlined in State v. Galli, 967 P.2d 30 (Utah 1998).
Several of these factors work in Defendant's favor. (1) Although there was a
victim to the offense, there was not significant injury done to the victim. (2)
There is a significant disagreement as to the extent of the Defendant's record,
with allegations by the Defendant that much of the felony record reported in
the presentence investigation report was inaccurate; (3) the Defendant
expressed to the trial court his desire to put his life back in order, and (4) the
court didn't consider his rehabilitative needs and the fact that he could have
become a productive member of society through a less drastic sentencing
alternative.

ARGUMENT
THE TRIAL COURT ABUSED ITS DISCRETION WHEN
IT SENTENCED THE DEFENDANT TO CONSECUTIVE
PRISON TERMS ON OFFENSES THAT OCCURRED IN
THE SAME CRIMINAL EPISODE.
The sentencing decision of a trial court is reviewed for an abuse of
discretion.

State v. Houk, 906 P.2d 907, 909 (Utah Ct. App. 1999)(per

curium). This includes the decision to grant or deny probation. See, State v.
Chapoose, 985 P.2d 915 (Utah 1999). An abuse of discretion occurs when "the
judge fails to consider all legally relevant factors or if the sentence imposed is
clearly excessive."

State v. McCovey, 803 P.2d
o

1234, 1235 (Utah

1990)(citations and quotations omitted). Furthermore, an appellate court can
only find an abuse of discretion "it if can be said that no reasonable [person]
would take the view adopted by the trial court.'5 State v. Honk, 906 P.2d at 909
(alteration in original)(quotations omitted).
The trial court abused its discretion in this case because it failed to
consider all the legally relevant factors and it imposed an excessive sentence.
Specifically, the trial court failed to consider the Defendant's rehabilitative
needs.
The Defendant pled guilty to a violation of a protective order and
aggravated assault, both arising in the same criminal episode. At the time of
sentencing there was a significant dispute regarding the accuracy of the
Defendant's prior criminal record as reported in the presentence report.
According to the Defendant in he was a victim of identity theft, and his name
and social security number were used by another individual who was
ultimately convicted of several felony offenses and served time in prison. The
Defendant acknowledges that he has a relatively long criminal record, but
denied that he had the lengthy record as reported in the presentence
investigation.

The Defendant did admit that he had been incarcerated in

California in 1974 on two different commitments and that he had gone to the
Utah State prison in 1979. (R. 073 / 8)
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The trial court indicated that it's inclination was to send him to prison
because "what really causes me the concern [is] three prior imprisonments and
continued violation of serious laws." (R. 073 / 9) The trial court did not ever
consider or address the Defendant's rehabilitative needs.

Defense counsel

argued that these were crimes that constituted a single criminal episode. This
argument was made in reliance on § 76-1-402 Single Criminal Episode, and §
76-3-401(2) which provides in relevant part:
In determining whether state offenses are to run concurrently or
consecutively, the court shall consider the gravity and
circumstances of the offenses, the number of victims, and the
history, character, and rehabilitative needs of the defendant.
The court stated, "they are different in the sense that would you got a stabbing
and you also have a protective order violation, his being there violates the
protective order and then the consequent stabbing is a separate offense, and I
think both of them, with his history, are sufficient to justify consecutive
sentences. (R. 073/10)
The possibility of rehabilitation by the Defendant together with his
disputed criminal history was apparently not considered by the trial court. In
State v. Galli, 967 P.2d 930 (Utah 1998), the Utah Supreme Court outlined four
mitigating factors that the trial court failed to consider. The Court reversed the
trial courts' decisions to impose consecutive sentences. The consideration of
these four mitigating factors is not discretionary with the sentencing court, but
11

is required by the Utah Supreme Court decision. In Galli, the Supreme Court
found that the trial courts' abused their discretion. "[T]he record shows that
Judges Iwasaki and Rigtrup may not have given adequate weight to certain
mitigating circumstances." Id. at 938.
There were at least two factors that the trial courts failed to consider
that caused them to abuse their discretion. Several of these factors can be
applied favorably to the Defendant's situation. The first factor was that Galli
had not inflicted physical injuries on his victims. Id. Galli had used a gun, but
it was a pellet gun that was incapable of inflicting a serious injury. Id. In the
case at bar, although the Defendant had inflicted some physical injury on his
victim1 that physical injury consisted of a couple of very small knife punctures
and obviously did not rise to the level of serious bodily injury or the Defendant
would have been charged with a second-degree felony aggravated assault.
The second factor in Galli was that his criminal history did not support
the imposition of consecutive sentences. Id. Here the Defendant did have
some prior criminal record, including a couple of prison sentences. However,
there is a significant dispute as to the length and extent of the Defendant's
criminal record due to the claims of identity theft. The third factor was that
Galli had voluntarily confessed and admitted responsibility for his crimes.

1

In the present case there was a single victim, unlike Galli.
12

"The record suggests that he has expressed a commitment and hope to improve
himself." Id. In the case at bar, the Defendant waived the preliminary hearing,
which allowed for the Defendant not to have this testify from the stand.
Furthermore, the Defendant voluntarily pled guilty to the two crimes on which
he was convicted, further relieving the victim of the necessity to appear in
court to testify as to the occurrences on the day in question.
The fourth and final Galli factor was that consecutive sentences were
not in accord with Galli's rehabilitative needs. The Supreme Court believed
that Galli's conduct in Minnesota showed that he had the ability to improve
himself and be a productive law abiding citizen. Id. Unfortunately in the case
at bar, the trial court totally failed to look at any possible rehabilitative needs of
the Defendant.

The trial court is absolutely silent regarding any possible

analysis as to the Defendant's ability to function in society, his ability to obtain
new or different training, or the rehabilitative needs the Defendant could use in
an effort to attempt to rehabilitate him back into society.
The trial court should have considered all of the factors outlined by the
Supreme Court in Galli. The trial court failed to consider these factors, and
therefore abused its discretion when it sentenced Defendant to the Utah State
Prison. For these reasons, the Defendant respectfully requests this Court to
remand this case back to the trial court so he can be re-sentenced.

1-2

CONCLUSION
The trial court abused its discretion when it failed to consider
Defendant's rehabilitative needs. The sentence was clearly excessive in the
imposition of consecutive sentences for a single criminal episode, and in the
absence of any analysis as to the advisability and possibility of rehabilitation.
For these reasons the Defendant respectfully requests this Court to remand his
case back to the trial court to be re-sentenced.
DATED this & day of October 2006.

W. (RICHARDS
Attorney for Appellant
LNDALL

CERTIFICATE OF MAILING
I certify that I mailed two copies of the foregoing Brief of Appellant to
Mark Shurtleff, Attorney General, Attorney for the Plaintiff, 160 East 300
South, 6th Floor, P.O. Box 140854, Salt Lake gfty,JJtah 841 l^OJL^O, postage
prepaid this h day of October 2006.

RANDALL W. RICHARDS
Attorney at Law
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SECOND DISTRICT COURT
OGDEN COUFPze&V/}O/o
bl
WEBER COUNTY, STATE OF
UTAH
OF UTAH
STRICT COURT
STATE OF UTAH,
Plaintiff,

MINUTES
APP SENTENCING
SENTENCE, JUDGMENT, COMMITMENT

vs.

Case No: 051903912 FS

THOMAS CLARK HILL,
Defendant

Judge:
Date

ROGER S DUTSON 4%p
March 13, 2006

PRESENT
Clerk:
dianew
Prosecutor: MARK R. DECARIA
Defendant
Defendant's Attorney(s): JIM RETALLICK (PDA)
Agency: Adult Probation and Parole
DEFENDANT INFORMATION
Date of birth: January 12, 1942
Video
Tape Number:
D031306
Tape Count: 354

3. AGGRAVATED ASSAULT - 3rd Degree Felony
Plea: Guilty - Disposition: 01/13/2006 Guilty
4. VIOLATION OF PROTECTIVE ORDER - 3rd Degree Felony
Plea: Guilty - Disposition: 01/13/2006 Guilty
HEARING
This is before the Court for sentencing. Defendant
present in custody from the Weber County Jail. Court finds
no legal basis why sentence should not be imposed.

y

4

^ %

Case No: 051903912
Date:
Mar 13, 2006
SENTENCE PRISON
Based on the defendant's conviction of AGGRAVATED ASSAULT a 3rd
Degree Felony, the defendant is sentenced to an indeterminate term
of not to exceed five years in the Utah State Prison.
Based on the defendant's conviction of VIOLATION OF PROTECTIVE
ORDER a 3rd Degree Felony, the defendant is sentenced to an
indeterminate term of not to exceed five years in the Utah State
Prison.
COMMITMENT is to begin immediately.
To the WEBER County Sheriff: The defendant is remanded to your
custody for transportation to the Utah State Prison where the
defendant will be confined.
SENTENCE PRISON CONCURRENT/CONSECUTIVE NOTE
Prison terms imposed to run consecutively to one another.

Credit is granted for ti^ie served.
Dated this / >

day of

^v^£^
iOGER # DUTSON
District Court Judqe
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IN THE SECOND JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT
IN AND FOR WEBER COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH

Case No. 051903912

STATE OF UTAH,

Appellate Case No. 20060309-CA

Plaintiff,

THOMAS C. HILL,
Defendant.
January 13, 2006
March 13, 2006

Pretrial Conference
Sentencing
BEFORE
THE HONORABLE ROGER S. DUTSON

CAROLYN ERJCKSON, CSR
CERTIFIED COURT TRANSCRIBER
1775 East Ellen Way
Sandy, Utah 84092
801-523-1186

Page 1

1

OGDEN, UTAH - JANUARY 13, 20 0 6

2

HONORABLE ROGER S. DUTSON PRESIDING

3 I

For the Plaintiff:

BRANDEN B. MILES

For the Defendant:

ROY COLE

P R O C E E D I N G S
6 I

COURT CLERK:

7 J Hill,#051903912.

State of Utah versus Thomas C.

Are we going to need the court reporter?

MR. COLE: We're not.

Mr. Hill, Your Honor.

9 | we have a resolution in this matter.
10

I think

Mr. Hill is going to pled

guilty to courts 3 and 4 in the matter, being aggravated

11 J assault and violation of a protective orders with priors, both
12 I 3rd degree felonies to run concurrently.
13

be dismissed.

14
15

All other counts will

THE COURT: The first degree felony is to be
dismissed?

16

MR. MILES: It is, Your Honor.

17

THE COURT: And have you gone over this with the

18
19

victim?
MR. MILES: I've talked to her at the pretrial about

20

dismissing that count and why and that's primarily based on the

21

fact that she has lied to us. She gave us statements about the

22

way things happened and then later on admitted she had lied to

23

us about those things.

24

evidence for the first degree felonies in this case.

25

So the State would not have sufficient

THE COURT: All right. And you have a written in

1

support of this plea?

2

MR. COLE: I do, Your Honor.

3

THE COURT: Have you gone over that, Mr. Hill?

4

THE DEFENDANT:

5

THE COURT: And do you understand it?

6

THE DEFENDANT:

7

THE COURT: You understand if you sign that document

Yes.

Yes.

8

agreeing to plead guilty to two third degree felonies, an

9

aggravated assault and a violation of a protective orders with

10

priors you would give up the right to have the State prove that

11

or make the State prove that at a trial.

12

those violations even though the others are dismissed.

13

understand that?

You'd be admitting
You

14

THE DEFENDANT:

Yes.

15

THE COURT: You shouldn't do this unless you are

16

guilty or believe it's in your best interest to do so.

And if

17

you're on any medications, alcohol, drugs or have any mental

18

health condition that would make it so you don't fully

19

understand, you shouldn't go ahead, nor should you proceed if

20

you're not satisfied with the legal representation that you

21

have received or if you don't understand the wording of this

22

agreement.

Do you wish to go ahead?

23

THE DEFENDANT:

Yes.

24

THE COURT: You may sign it then.

25

MR. COLE: It's already been signed by myself and by

1

Mr. Miles.

2
3

THE COURT: Okay, it appears the defendant is acting
freely and voluntarily.

4
5

Now, is there a weapon enhancement on any of these as
they now stand?

6

MR. MILES: On count 3 and 4 there is not, Your Honor.

7

THE COURT: Now, counts 3 and 4 are not the same on

8

your complaint, apparently, as on the calendar, because count 2

9

is the aggravated assault.

10
11

MR. MILES: Okay. You don't have our amended
information that we filed onJ THE COURT: I might but I just know the calendar shows

12
13

that.

14

COURT CLERK: Shows what?

15

THE COURT: That count 2 is aggravated assault.

16

COURT CLERK: Well, count 1 was already dismissed so

17

that's why it's not appearing on the calendar.

18

aggravated kidnaping is count 2.

19

count 3.

20

Technically the

That aggravated assault is

THE COURT: Okay, so that's how it's counted out, but

21

anyway we're talking about an aggravated assault and a

22

violation of a protective order and they're not enhanced at all

23

by the weapon.

24

MR. MILES: No, we did not file an enhancement.

25

THE COURT: With that.

1

MR. MILES: Correct.

2

THE COURT: All right, to the charge of aggravated

3

assault, a third degree felony, how do you plead?

4

THE DEFENDANT:

Guilty.

5

THE COURT: And to the violation of a protective order

6

with prior convictions for violating a protective order or

7

domestic violence offense, how do you pled?

8

THE DEFENDANT: Guilty.

9

THE COURT: What does the State claim happened here?

10

MR. MILES: Your Honor, on the date alleged in the

11

information, I'll start with the protective order first.

The

12

defendant was a respondent for a protective order with that

13

victim being the petitioner.

14

of that protective order on May 18th of 2005.

15

order prohibited him from having any direct or indirect

16

contact, committing any acts of violence or being at the

17

petitioner's residence. On the date alleged in the information

18

the defendant was also previously convicted of domestic

19

violence, assault on June 4th of 2003. That occurred here in

20

front of Judge Medley here in the Second District Court.

21

the dates alleged in the information of August 9th of 2005, the

22

defendant was staying at the residence.

23

into a argument where he grabbed sort of Army style butter

24

knife during the argument and he stabbed her in the back of the

25

neck, causing a small puncture there and then he ended up

He was served with a valid copy
That protective

On

He and the victim got

1

stabbing her also in the arm, causing a small puncture again

2

there.

3

THE COURT: Okay.

The Court will make this written

4

statement in support of a plea a part of the official record

5

and find sufficient facts to enter the plea and order for it t

6 I be Adult Probation (inaudible)
7 |

COURT CLERK: February 27th.
THE COURT: February 27th.

We'll see you back here

9 I then.
10 J
11
12
13
14
15
16
17
18
19
20
21
22
23
24

(Whereupon the hearing was concluded)
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P R O C E E D I N G S
MR. RETALLICK: No. 4 on the calendar, Thomas Hill,
Your Honor
COURT CLERK:
case #051903912.

State of Utah versus Thomas C. Hill,

Time set for sentencing.

THE COURT: - probation officer that I agree with the
concept of what he was trying to get across with the
recommendation for jail but MR. RETALLICK: This is Mr. Hill, Your Honor.
THE COURT: (inaudible) keeps doing that.
MS. ?:

Yes, Your Honor.

MR. RETALLICK: As the Court may recall this matter
was continued for AP&P to try to verify some of the criminal
history of defendant.
THE COURT: We need to see what these California
charges really were all about.
MR. RETALLICK:

Your Honor, according to an

investigation done my Mr. LePlant, he said prior to preparing
pre-sentence report "I reviewed the defendant's arrest history
extensively, comparing his birth date and social security
number to the BCI and Triple I information.

I also reviewed

1

limited computer records for AP&P regarding his commitment to

2

the Utah State Prison in

3

A

78 and '81.

Made contact with Alisha

• Wilson, tech for BCI who informed me that prior to an arrest

4

being placed on defendant's arrest record they had compared the

5

arrested person's fingerprints with the ones they currently

6

have on file.

7

individuals."

8
9

They also used fingerprints to identify alias of
'

And so basically they're saying that the criminal
history that they have here is correct.

Mr. Hill again is

10

refuting many of the items.

11

prison once before and that he had successfully terminated

12

prison in 1981; that - and quite frankly, Your Honor/ I have a

13

real difficult time believing this Alisha Wilson tech with BCI

14

saying every time they place on somebody's records they compare

15

the fingerprints.

16

here with people who have not been - their criminal history has

17

shown - or indicated crimes that they were in fact not guilty

18

of and so I, you know, I just - I find it absolutely amazing

19

that they're going to compare fingerprints every

20

time they attribute something as long as the social security

21

and birth date match up, that's all they usually go on.

22

He does admit that he was in

I can't tell you how many times I've been

Mr. Hill maintains that he was the victim of an

23

identify theft.

An old roommate of his took his name, date of

24

birth and social security number and has been using it for a

25

number of years.

But Mr. Hill does admit that he was in prison

1

in 1981.

2

disorderly conduct.

3

There was a warrant served and he was returned to California. -

4
5

He admits that he had some minor offenses, the
In 1987 it says fugitive from justice.

Wasn't it, in fact, you still maintain that was not
you, is that correct?

6

THE DEFENDANT: That wasn't me.

7 I

MR. RETALLICK: He has never been extradited to
California in any case, Your Honor.

9 I

He admits the domestic violence in 2001. I think he

10

admits the simple assault, class B, in 2003.

11

where we go from here, Your Honor.

12

So I don't know

THE COURT: Well, I'll make note of those differences
x

13

and frankly I show two commitments in California, one in

14

Kachino and one in Susanville.

15

THE DEFENDANT: I did

16

THE COURT: And then you were sent to prison in Utah

17

74 in

Do you admit those?
(inaudible).

in ^79.

18

THE DEFENDANT:

(inaudible).

19

THE COURT: There's a possibility that you are correct

20

on the identity theft.

21

Adult Probation department, it does look like they have now

22

gone back to compare fingerprints at least.

23

always but I do believe that this re-referral that that has

24

been confirmed.

25

However having referred it back to

Perhaps they don't

MR. RETALLICK: It doesn't state that there was any

comparison of fingerprints, Your Honor.

What it states is that

DCI says before they do this, this is the general rule.

It

doesn't state that they specifically did it for this defendant.
THE COURT: Yeah.
reguested.

Well, they're confirming what I had

I understand your argument.
Anything more, Mr. Hill?
THE DEFENDANT: No, sir.
THE COURT: Does the State have anything further?
MR. DECARIA: Now I'm concerned about what the

defendant is contending with regard to this past criminal
record.
THE COURT: Frankly I don't think it's going to make
too much difference to the Court because, except for the prison
terms, that's what really causes me the concern of three prior
imprisonments and continued violations of serious laws.

That's

what I'm basing my sentence on.
MR. DECARIA:

Okay, I'll submit it.

THE COURT: Other than the ones that are clearly
admitted here but they're misdemeanors.
It is the sentence of this Court that you serve a
zero to five year term at the Utah State Prison on the
aggravated assault and that you serve a zero to five year term
on the violation of the protective order and because of your
serious history, I'm ordering that they run consecutive to each
other. You've not shown that you've changed sufficiently to

justify otherwise.

I'll give you credit for time served on

these charges since you were booked but these are to run
consecutive to each other.
MR. RETALLICK:

Your Honor, weren't these one

continuous criminal episode?
THE COURT: Not really because the facts that gave
rise to each were clearly different.
MR. RETALLICK: I understandTHE COURT: And they are different in the sense that
when you've got a stabbing and you also have a protective order
violation, his being there violates the protective order and
then the consequent stabbing is a separate offense and I think
both of them, with his history, are sufficient to justify
consecutive sentences.

That's (inaudible).

Oh, Mr. Hill, you have 30 days in which to appeal the
sentencing.
(Whereupon the hearing.was concluded)

10
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